





































Ismael Rodríguez-Lara and Luis Moreno-Garrido
Self-interest and justice principles ad
serie




Los documentos de trabajo del Ivie ofrecen un avance de los resultados de las 
investigaciones económicas en curso, con objeto de generar un proceso de 
discusión previo a su remisión a las revistas científicas. Al publicar este 
documento de trabajo, el Ivie no asume responsabilidad sobre su contenido.  
 
Ivie working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way 
in order to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientific 
journals for their final publication. Ivie’s decision to publish this working paper 
does not imply any responsibility for its content. 
 
 
La Serie AD es continuadora de la labor iniciada por el Departamento de 
Fundamentos de Análisis Económico de la Universidad de Alicante en su 
colección “A DISCUSIÓN” y difunde trabajos de marcado contenido teórico. 
Esta serie es coordinada por Carmen Herrero. 
 
The AD series, coordinated by Carmen Herrero, is a continuation of the work 
initiated by the Department of Economic Analysis of the Universidad de 
Alicante in its collection “A DISCUSIÓN”, providing and distributing papers 
marked by their theoretical content. 
 
 
Todos los documentos de trabajo están disponibles de forma gratuita en la web 
del Ivie http://www.ivie.es, así como las instrucciones para los autores que 
desean publicar en nuestras series. 
 
Working papers can be downloaded free of charge from the Ivie website 
http://www.ivie.es, as well as the instructions for authors who are interested in 










Edita / Published by: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
 
Depósito Legal / Legal Deposit no.: V-1399-2010 
 




Self-interest and justice principles
*
 









We introduce non-enforceable property rights over bargaining surplus in a 
dictator game with production, in which the effort of the agents is 
differentially rewarded. Using experimental data we elicit individual 
preferences over the egalitarian, the accountability and the libertarian 
principle and provide evidence to support the inability of these justice 
principles to account for the observed behavior. Although this finding is 
consistent with the idea of individuals interpreting justice principles 
differently, we show that dictators behave self-interested concerning 
redistribution and choose which justice principle best maximizes their own 
payoff. We interpret this result as the justice norm imposing a constraint on 
otherwise self-maximizing agents. 
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 31 Introduction
The dictator game has long been presented as generating clear evidence to support the view that agents
behave unsel￿shly. In this game, one of the players (dictator) chooses how to split a certain amount of money
between herself and her counterpart (recipient), who has no strategic input into the ￿nal outcome. Thus,
the prediction is that dictators will give nothing to recipients if the dictators are not altruistic. However,
dictators frequently violate this prediction in experiments, giving around 20% of the pie (see Camerer 2003
for a review of the results).
Although the dictator￿ s behavior has been usually interpreted as support for other-regarding preferences,
recent studies emphasize that the dictator game has a caveat for studying fairness or altruistic attitudes
given that players do not contribute to the production of the surplus that is distributed. In this vein,
Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002) ￿nd, under anonymous conditions, that 95% of dictators transfer no
money at all when their e⁄ort determines the size of the pie, whereas Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) point out
that dictators will be prone to give more money away if recipients work for the pie. The idea of desert is also
presented in other studies such as Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Kurki (2004), who discuss the relationship
between choices based on entitlements and egalitarian divisions of the pie and conclude that dictators are
basically motivated by the former criterion.
Our goal in this paper is to elicit the subjects￿preferences over justice principles when the e⁄ort of the
agents is di⁄erentially rewarded to determine the size of the pie. We design a laboratory experiment with two
phases. In the ￿rst phase (the earning stage), subjects earn money by answering a multiple-choice test that
pays for each correct answer a ￿xed random reward. This reward is the same for all questions but might vary
across individuals according to three di⁄erent treatments in which dictators are paid less than, more than,
or equal to the recipient for each correct answer. Hence, two factors determine a person￿ s contribution to the
pie: her score on the test and the rate at which this score is turned into money. Using this procedure, the
available surplus to be divided depends on agents￿e⁄ort: as a result, rational behavior should be produced,
as argued by Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002). In the second phase (the allocation stage), the dictators
are randomly selected to split the earned surplus after being informed about each agent￿ s reward for each
correct answer and all members￿contribution to the pie. Since it is common knowledge that reward levels
and roles are completely random, it is likely that distributional preferences based on property rights are
highlighted. In particular, the outcome of the second stage is then expected to be categorized according to
three di⁄erent justice principles: (i) dividing the surplus into two identical parts (egalitarian principle), (ii)
using the number of agents￿correct answers to split the pie (accountability principle) or (iii) taking into
2account agents￿monetary contribution to the surplus (libertarian principle).1 We refer to these as natural
justice principles.
We ￿nd that there is no single natural justice principle that can explain the allocators￿choice but that
dictators adapt themselves to the exogenous payo⁄ parameter and seem to behave according to the "most
sel￿sh" of the natural justice principles. Hence, when dictators earn the money under unfavorable conditions
(i.e., when they are paid a smaller reward per correct answer), we reject the libertarian principle (which
bases redistribution on the agents￿monetary contribution). However, the egalitarian or the accountability
principle (which ignore the reward discrimination introduced by experimenters) can be presented as a plau-
sible explanation to describe their behavior in this framework. Not surprisingly, such justice principles do
not appear to characterize the dictators￿choice when they have earnings under an advantageous position
(i.e., when they are paid a higher reward per correct answer). The evidence in this latter scenario pinpoints
that dictators respect agents￿monetary contribution to the surplus during the ￿rst stage, in spite of the
exogenous reward discrimination.
The inexistence of a unique natural justice principle supports the main ￿ndings of Cappelen et al. (2007,
2009) who highlight that individuals are heterogeneous regarding justice attitudes. However, they do not
￿nd evidence for self-serving bias and assume that "individuals have a fairness ideal that is independent of
the distributional function in which they ￿nd themselves" [Cappelen et al. 2007, page 824]. In contrast, our
evidence suggests that dictators endorse a biased-fairness ideal and justice attitudes are context-dependent.
More precisely, we show that the justice principle that dictators endorse depends on the external circum-
stances (i.e., the rewards) that determine the surplus.2
The in￿ uence of the context in distributional justice has been studied in the ￿eld of empricial social choice
since Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984), who attempt at evaluating several distribution mechanisms by the way of
1Our approach can also be seen as an attempt at studying the extent to which the dictator feels responsable by the reward
di⁄erences and tries to compensate for them in a laboratory experiment. See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2009) for a review of
the literature on compensation. To see that e⁄ort and the resulting sense of entitlement decreases self-interested behavior, read
Konow (2000) and List (2007). Importantly, we randomly assign roles and rewards, what accounts for the problem of equality
of opportunity given that each subject is given exactly the same opportunities to be rewarded more or less than her counterpart,
regardless of their perfomance in the test. The introduction of the random reward is also key to test the libertarian principle,
as the accountability and the libetarian principle di⁄er in the weight that subjects assign to e⁄ort and circumstances. Finally,
roles are randomly assigned because if the dictator is chosen after scoring higher in the test then sel￿sh behavior arises more
frequently (Ho⁄man et al. 1994). This may occur because the dictator associates her role with property rights (i.e., because the
dictator role is "earned") or simply because the use of this device to identify the person who is the dictator alerts the dictator
to what her property rights are (Harrison and McKee, 1985).
2Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Bardsley (2008) use a di⁄erent approach to show that altruistic concerns change according
to the "price of giving".
3a questionnaire. Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) ask subjects to choose between di⁄erent allocations and show
that framing e⁄ects matter as individuals will be prone to choose di⁄erent solutions for the same distribution
problems depending on the prevalence of tastes or needs in the story underlaying each question. The "stated
context" is also an important feauture in Konow (2001), who proposes a theory of positive justice in which
three di⁄erent justice principles (the accountability principle, e¢ ciency and taste) interact with the context
to determine the ￿nal allocation. Konow (2001) concludes that context matters because of the interpretation
and application of the justice principles, rather than because of the lack of general principles. This idea of
context-dependent justice di⁄ers from Young (1994) or Greenberg (1996), who suggest that fairness de￿es
generalization as the contextual details are crucial to understand the concept of justice.3
To explore the issue of the lack of general principle, we leave aside the treatment approach while under-
taking a pooled data analysis. In this framework, we seek for a justice principle that explains the dictator￿ s
behavior. We reject the hypothesis that any of the three natural justice principles above explains our data,
but we cannot reject the hypothesis that dictators divide the pie according to a "bias principle" which is
de￿ned as the most convenient justice principle applicable in each instance. This bias principle encompasses
the idea that all the justice principles are equally fair from the dictator￿ s point of view, so the dictator chooses
the one that maximizes her own payo⁄. The rationale for the bias principle is related to Karni and Safra
(2002). They model the individual￿ s preferences by considering two di⁄erent components: the self-interest
and the individual￿ s moral value judgment. Then, Karni and Safra (2002) de￿ne a self-interested individual
as the one who prefers an allocation over another if both are equally fair and the former is preferred over the
latter. In our case, self-interest can be interpreted as the dictator￿ s tendency to allocate the surplus according
to the most favorable justice principle. This idea of "bias" justice goes back to Messick and Sentis (1983),
who show that subjects choose equity (i.e., the accountability principle) or equality (i.e., the egalitarian
principle) in a self-interested manner.4
Our ￿ndings represent a novelty in the dictator game literature by suggesting that dictators are self-
interested agents who may not be concerned by the other agent￿ s payo⁄s but constrained by the justice norms.
In that sense, we do not propose to model the dictator￿ s preferences by relying on the social preferences
literature which, roughly speaking, underscore the assumption that allocators￿utility does not depend only
on their ￿nal payo⁄s but also on that of other agents as well as on the relationship between both amounts.5 We
3Konow (2001) refers to this idea as context-speci￿c justice. In this paper, we refer to context-dependent justice to stress
that individuals endorse a justice principle which depends on the experimental treatment.
4Messick and Sentis (1983) conclude that agents have egocentric bias and have a tendency to believe it more fair for them
to keep money for another to do so in the same situation. Recently, Cappelen et al. (2008) explore this idea in an experiment
that involves real e⁄ort to explain the di⁄erence between rich and poor countries.
5These models usually consider that dictators give money away because they have increasing utility in recipients￿payo⁄
4instead conjecture that deviations from narrow self-interest are basically motivated by a context-dependent
justice principle. As a result, dictators maximize their own payo⁄s constrained by being considered fair
by at least one of the natural justice principles. Then, individuals exhibit a weak preference for fairness
(Dana, Weber and Xi Kuang 2007) or at least a self-interested preference over redistribution (Rutstr￿m and
Williams 2000).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 o⁄ers a template for di⁄erent justice principles
that could be considered in our dictator game analysis and formally presents our hypotheses. We outline
our experimental design in Section 3 and devote Section 4 to present the main results, which are based on
robust procedures. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Sel￿shness and Justice Principles in the Dictator Game
Consider the dictator game in which players can be labeled i 2 fa;bg such that i = a (player a) embodies
the dictator and i = b (player b) is the recipient. The dictator has to divide a certain surplus (M ￿ 0)
between herself and her counterpart, where the available amount of money to be shared depends on agents￿
contribution to the pie, denoted by mi ￿ 0 for i = fa;bg:
In particular,
M = ma + mb = paqa + pbqb
where qi ￿ 0 represents agent i￿ s performance in a previous stage and pi > 0 is the weight assigned to
this input (in our context, subjects will be asked to solve a questionnaire, so qi will be the number of agent
i￿ s correct answers in a quiz and pi the reward for each correct answer).
We denote s 2 [0;1] the proportion of the surplus that dictator allocates to the recipient, where s(p;q) :
R2
+ ￿ Z2
+ ! [0;1]; for p = (pa;pb) and q = (qa;qb):
De￿nition 1 We say that the dictator is purely sel￿sh if s(p;q) = 0, 8p > 0;q ￿ 0: When s(p;q) = 0:5,
8p > 0;q ￿ 0; we say that the dictator allocation satis￿es the egalitarian principle.
Therefore, a sel￿sh dictator would keep the entire surplus, regardless of the agents￿contribution to the
pie, whereas an egalitarian dictator would choose to divide it equally, ignoring the source of the surplus or
its size. This de￿nition makes the Nash Equilibrium prediction for non-altruistic dictators compatible with
(Kritikosa and Bollea 2001; Andreoni and Miller 2002), because they dislike payo⁄ di⁄erences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels 2000; Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Kurki 2004) or because they want to maximize the lowest payo⁄ to any one
party (Engelmann and Strobel 2004).
5the dictator￿ s sel￿sh behavior. The egalitarian behavior is related to the underlying idea of the inequality
aversion models, which consider that people dislike unequal outcomes, regardless of the source of the inequal-
ity. Nevertheless, these concepts are distant from other justice theories that plead for a solution in which
entitlements over the available surplus are directly determined by the Aristotle￿ s idea of proportionality.
De￿nition 2 Let xq: =
qb
qa+qb denote the proportion of the answers that is due to the recipient. We say
that the dictator follows the accountability principle if s(p;q) = xq:
We say that the dictator behaves according to the accountability principle whenever she relies on discre-
tionary variables (the number of correct answers) to make the division of the pie. Basically, this notion of
justice corresponds to an equity principle as it relies on the subject￿ s performance (i.e., the inputs). Overall,
the accountability principle implies that those factors that cannot be controlled by agents (i.e., the rewards)
should not be considered by dictators when they are making their choice. In that vein, the ￿nal allocation
would depend solely on the exerted e⁄ort (Roemer 1998).6
It can be argued, however, that each person should receive exactly what she produces (Nozick 1974) for
an allocation to be considered just.
De￿nition 3 Let xm: = mb
ma+mb denote the proportion of the surplus that is due to the recipient. We say
that the dictator follows the libertarian principle if s(p;q) = xm:
The libertarian principle embodies the idea that those who had been lucky with reward assignments
should not be punished to favor those who had been not. Unlike the previous principles, the libertarian idea
does not assign any value to equality and stands for the case in which nature (i.e., luck or birth) plays a
crucial role.
We assume that any of the above principles could be claimed to re￿ ect entitlements over bargaining
surplus and, thereby, they could be considered plausible justice norms from the dictators￿point of view. The
egalitarian principle implies that neither the score in the test nor the prices is important to determine the
dictators￿giving. The accountability principle is based solely on the ￿rst factor, and the libertarian principle
is based on both. We refer to these principles as natural justice principles.7
6The accountability principle is also referred to as liberal egalitarianism or the attribution theory. Konow (2000) studies the
extent to which this principle can explain the dictator￿ s choice. See Fleurbaey (2008) for the relationship between responsibility
and justice principles and Konow (2003) for a further description of various theories of justice.
7Of course, there exist cases in which these principles overlap. For instance, if pa = pb; then the accountability and the
libertarian principle coincide (xq = xm). When qa = qb, the accountability principle and the egalitarian principle coincide
(xq = 0:5): When the agents￿monetary contribution to the pie is the same (ma = mb), then the libertarian and the egalitarian
principles coincide (xm = 0:5).
6If justice were a genuine concept, then dictators would follow any of them when dividing the surplus. We
state this hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1. Dictators allocate the surplus according to a single natural principle and follow the egalitar-
ian, the accountability or the libertarian principle, regardless of the external factors (i.e., the reward
levels) that determine the subject￿ s contribution to the pie.
We want to reject Hypothesis 1 so as to claim that there is no unique or absolute natural justice principle
to explain the dictator￿ s behavior. This ￿nding would be consistent with individuals being heterogeneous
regarding justice attitudes, as pointed out by Cappelen et al. (2007, 2009). However, they assume that
individuals endorse a justice principle that is not context-dependent. This implies that dictators are equally
likely to distribute earnings according to each of the natural justice principles, regardless of the treatment
conditions. We depart from this view and conjecture that justice principles are not stationary but a⁄ected by
the exogenous variable (i.e., the reward levels). In the next section, we show that context matter by showing
that dictators do not divide the total surplus according to the libertarian principle (i.e., the criteria based on
earnings) when they are at a relative disadvantage with regard to accumulating money (pa < pb), whereas
the accountability principle (i.e., the criteria based on e⁄ort) cannot be rejected in that case. Similarly,
dictators follow the libertarian principle instead of the accountability principle when their correct answers
are being rewarded at a higher rate (pa > pb).
Our second hypothesis states that dictators who transfer money away do not really have a preference
relation for fairness but justice principles impose a constraint on their behavior (i.e., dictators try to maximize
their earnings while being fair by at least one of the principles). The rationale for this hypothesis is that
dictators are self-interested agents who endorse a bias fairness ideal and transfer xb: = minfxq;xm;0:5g,
which is the minimum amount that they have to give away so as to appear just by at least one of the
principles.8
Hypothesis 2. When dictators give money away, they do not do not employ a bias principle, that is, they
transfer an amount of money that is di⁄erent to the one that maximizes their own payo⁄, among the
fair allocations. Formally, s(p;q) 6= xb:
We want to reject Hypothesis 2 so as to claim that dictators who give money away allocate based on
recipients￿contribution, choosing which natural justice principle best maximizes their earnings. We use the
8As an alternative, we may think that dictators evaluate the egalitarian, the accountability and the libertarian principle as
equally fair, precisely because all of them are natural justice principles. In that case, self-interest makes subjects to choose the
most convinient principle to maximize their payo⁄. This reasoning is in line with Karni and Safra (2002).
7bias principle as the plausible self-serving bias explanation to describe behavior. Our interpretation can be
also related to the idea outlined by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) who explore the role of fairness in
the ￿rm￿ s maximization problem and conclude that ￿rms are constrained by fairness ideals when maximizing
pro￿ts.
3 Experimental Design
A total of 144 students reporting no previous experience in experiments were recruited from the University
of Alicante in May 2008 and November 2008. Through 6 di⁄erent sessions, subjects were received in the
Laboratory for Theoretical and Experimental Economics (LaTEx) and were invited to take a numbered ball
to determine their place during the computerized experiment. The Laboratory consists of 24 networked
computer workstations in separate cubicles. The experiment was implemented using the z-Tree software due
to Fischbacher (2007).
The Earning Stage
When the subjects are in front of their computers, instructions are read aloud and students understand that
they have to individually complete a test that will provide earnings for the second stage of the experiment.
At this point, it is common knowledge that the test is the same for all individuals and that subjects are
also informed about the existence of a second phase. However, they are not told that the test is intended
to redistribute earnings. The quiz takes 35 minutes and contains 20 multiple-choice questions, with only
one correct answer over the ￿ve possibilities. Before answering the questions, subjects know that each of
their correct answers will be randomly paid at a certain reward rate pi 2 [p0;p1]; for i 2 fa;bg. The reward
coincides for all questions but might vary across individuals. The values of p0 and p1 are common knowledge
but the realization of pi is unknown until the second period.9
Treatments
When the time for the test expires, subjects are randomly matched in pairs and assigned a type, namely
"player a" (dictators) or "player b" (recipients). This type does not depend on agents￿performance in the
9The instructions are in the appendix and the complete test is available on request. We use questions 1 to 10 given by List
and Cherry (2000) and 10 additional questions of our own. We use List and Cherry (2000) because their questions are easy to
solve but time-consuming. List and Cherry (2000) argue that their questions are a good way to measuring e⁄ort, rather than
talent.
8test and is used to determine the subjects￿role through the second stage of the experiment as well as the
reward for their correct answers. We ￿x pa = 150 pesetas10 and pb 2 f100;150;200g pesetas as follows.
In our dictator worse (DW) treatment, with 24 observations, dictators are treated relatively worse than
recipients since their correct answers are paid at a lower reward rate, so pa = 150 pesetas and pb = 200
pesetas. In the dictator better (DB) treatment, with 24 observations, the previous situation is reversed and
type-a players receive a higher reward per correct answer than type-b players, that is, pa = 150 pesetas and
pb = 100 pesetas. Finally, in our baseline (BL) treatment, with 24 observations, reward levels coincide for
both subjects, so pa = pb = 150 pesetas.
The Allocation Stage
When subjects are informed about their rewards and their contribution to the pie, it is common knowledge
that reward levels and roles have been randomly decided. The total surplus is then divided according to a
dictators￿decision, which is made under anonymous conditions.11
In the allocation stage, "player b" was asked to make an hypothetical division of the surplus. The purpose
of asking subjects b to perform a choice task was to prevent them from identifying player a by observing
some subjects making a choice and others not.
A show-up fee of 4 Euros is paid to each participant at the end of the session, regardless of their
performance in the quiz.
4 Behavior in the dictator game
On average, the dictators divided around 3000 pesetas (18 Euros) in the allocation stage and no signi￿cant
di⁄erence exists between the number of dictators￿and recipients￿correct answers except in the BL treatment,
where recipients have more correct answers than dictators.12
10It is standard practice for all experiments run in Alicante to use Spanish pesetas as experimental currency. The reason for
this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates integer problems, compared with other currencies (USD or Euros, for example).
Second, although Spanish pesetas are no longer in use (replaced by the Euro in 2002), Spanish people still use pesetas to express
monetary values in their everyday life. In this respect, by using a "real" (as opposed to an arti￿cial) currency, we avoid the
problem of framing the incentive structure of the experiment using a scale (e.g. "Experimental Currency") with no cognitive
content. Exchange rate: 1 Euro = 166,386 pesetas.
11We do not use a double-blind procedure because it might make agents skeptical about whether transfers will be carried out
(Bolton, Katok and Zwick 1998). The appendix provides further details about the allocation stage.
12In the BL treatment, the null H0 : qa = qb can be rejected at a 5% signi￿cance level in favor of the alternative H1 : qa 6= qb
(t = 2:14, p ￿ value = 0:036).
9Table 1 summarizes the main variables for each treatment and presents an overview of our data. In the
earning stage, qi denotes the average number of correct answers for player i 2 fa;bg. In the allocation stage,
s 2 [0;1] stands for the proportion of the pie that dictators give away, whereas (s ￿ xq) and (s ￿ xm) are
used to measure the dictator￿ s deviation from the accountability and the libertarian principle, respectively.
In all the cases, standard deviations are reported in brackets.13
We ￿nd that positive transfers occur 90% of the time and that average distribution is around 40 percent
of the pie, which is signi￿cantly higher than the average distribution in dictator games without production.
This may indicate that the presence of the earning stage makes people care more about fairness consideration
(Cappelen et al. 2007; Oxoby and Spraggon 2008). We observe in Table 1 that the shares given away are
higher in the DW scenario than in the rest of the treatments.14 One way to interpret why s 2 [0;1] is higher
in the DW is to recall that pa < pb in this case, so it is likely for the recipient￿ s monetary contribution
to the pie to be higher in this framework. Indeed, we can see that (s ￿ xm) is never positive in the DW
treatment, whereas the mean of this di⁄erence is close to zero in the DB treatment. Across treatments, we
also observe that deviations from the accountability principle are not constant and that (s￿xq) is closer to
zero in the DW treatment. These ￿ndings suggest that entitlements are important to drive behavior but that
justice principles seem to be treatment-dependent. For instance, it seems that the accountability principle
can explain the dictator￿ s behavior in the DW treatment but it is not the case for the libertarian principle.
We provide further evidence for this conjecture in Figure 1. Along the horizontal axis, we plot the
proportion of the pie that is due to recipients￿performance in the quiz and we use the vertical axis to
represent dictators￿ giving, s 2 [0;1]. As a consequence, the 45-degree line represents the appropriate
theoretical prediction in the sense that observations on this line indicate that recipients are being transferred
exactly the proportion of the pie that they have contributed. Since the recipients￿contribution to the pie
depends on inputs and payments, we distinguish between the proportion of the pie that is due to recipients￿
correct answers (xq) in Figure 1a and the proportion of the pie that is due to their monetary contribution
(xm) in Figure 1b.
In the DW treatment (pa < pb), self-interested dictators would be strictly better o⁄ if they followed the
accountability principle instead of the libertarian principle. Figure 1a suggests that (on average) dictators
rely on recipients￿correct answers when they split the money. This is the case because of the data clouds
13We do not report the results for player b, given that economic incentives were not involved in their decision. However, the
conclusions for player a do also hold for player b.
14If we compare average giving, the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant across treatments (e.g., t = 1:38; p ￿ value = 0:174 for the
comparison between DW and DB). However, we reject that the distributions of o⁄ers are the same using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (KS = 0:33; p ￿ value = 0:089). A Chow test yields the same results.
10around the line predicted by the accountability principle. Figure 1b actually shows that observations lie
on the right-hand side of the 45-degree line when we consider the libertarian principle as the theoretical
prediction. This implies that the recipients￿monetary contribution to the pie is an upper bound from the
dictators￿objective of deciding how much to give in this treatment. As commented above, the straightforward
interpretation is that dictators do not transfer their earnings to the recipients, which is probably under the
belief that recipients are being paid a higher reward per correct answer.
The key question to be addressed is whether dictators behave in a self-interested manner. We undertake
a similar approach to Konow (2000) to study the extent to which each natural justice principle can explain
the dictator￿ s behavior in each of the treatments. We estimate si = ￿ + ￿xk;i + "i for k 2 fq;mg and test
for the intercept (￿) not being signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero and the slope (￿) not being signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from one in each of the treatments. If the null hypothesis H0 : ￿ = 0;￿ = 1 cannot be rejected
after running the regression over the independent variable xq (xm); then we will not ￿nd evidence against
the accountability (libertarian) principle. In both regressions, not rejecting the hypothesis that the intercept
is 0.5 and the slope is 0 would imply that there is no evidence to reject that dictators follow the egalitarian
principle, giving away half of the pie.
In Table 2 we report the estimates of the parameters (￿ and ￿) and the corresponding p-values for the
individual signi￿cance (in brackets). We consider the Huber/White sandwich estimator of the variance to
accomplish robust estimates. We also report the results after predicting the median o⁄er by minimizing the
sum of absolute residuals (i.e., we run quantile regressions).15 Additionally, we report in Table 2 the results
for the hypothesis testing (i.e., the statistical values), including the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
In the linear regressions, we ￿nd that the intercept is generally not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero but
that the slope is. If we test for the justice principles, we observe that regardless of the procedure, the
dictator￿ s allocation fails to satisfy the libertarian principle in the DW treatment (F2;22 = 7:93, F2;22 = 8:03
and W = 4:09, with p ￿ value = 0:0025, 0:0024 and 0:0000 respectively), although we cannot reject the
accountability principle in this case (F2;22 = 2:04, F2;22 = 1:39 and W = 0:93, where p ￿ value = 0:1534,
0:2705 and 0:3529 respectively).16 The results are reversed for the DB treatment. In this case, we cannot
15We bootstrap the results to ensure that the standard errors are correct if the residuals are neither normally distributed nor
homoscedastic. Robust procedures (i.e., the use of the Huber/White sandwich estimator) allows the ￿tting of a model that does
contain heteroscedastic residuals. Additionally, quantile regressions protects against the in￿uence of vertical outliers, which are
de￿ned as observations that have outlying values for the y dimension but are not outlying in the x dimension. See Kennedy
(2008) for an introduction to robust procedures and Rousseuw and Leroy (2003) for a more detailed analysis.
16The results for the egalitarian principle are not clear-cut. We reject the egalitarian principle in light of the robust regression
estimates (F2;22 = 4:28, p￿value = 0:0269), but we cannot do so in light of the quantile regression and the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test (F2;22 = 0:61 and W = 1:06, with p ￿ value = 0:5524 and 0:2889 respectively)
11reject the libertarian principle (F2;22 = 0:88, F2;22 = 0:00 and W = 0:29, with p ￿ value = 0:4278, 1 and
0:7719), but the accountability and the egalitarian principle can be rejected at any plausible signi￿cance
level (p￿value < 0:0032 in all the cases). As a result, there exists no natural justice principle that survives
in all treatment conditions.
In the last column of Table 2 we observe that none of the natural justice principles can be used to explain
the pooled data (p ￿ values < 0:0020 in all the cases). Our second hypothesis states that dictators do
not behave as self-interested agents in the sense that they will not distribute earnings according to the most
favorable justice principle in each instance. We employ pooled data analysis to test this hypothesis. We isolate
the e⁄ect of purely sel￿sh dictators and estimate si = ￿+￿xb;i +"i; where xb := minfxq;xm;0:5g is de￿ned
as the bias principle. Alternatively, we can estimate the median o⁄er by considering med(si) = ￿+￿xb;i+"i;
where xb := minfxq;xm;0:5g: In both cases, we test the null hypothesis H0 : ￿ = 0;￿ = 1 to reject that
dictators endorse a biased ideal of fairness.17
The results in Table 3 show that the intercept is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero but that the slope
is. Moreover, none of the test procedures rejects the hypothesis that the bias principle drives dictators￿
behavior (F2;60 = 0:69;F2;60 = 0:35; W = 0:10, with p ￿ values = 0:5064; 0:7056 and 0:9172; respectively).
We interpret this result as evidence rejecting Hypothesis 2: therefore dictators appear to behave according
to the most favorable justice principle (bias principle) when dividing the pie.
5 Conclusion
All during 80￿ s and 90￿ s, researchers have presented the dictator game as paradigmatic situation to support
the agent￿ s deviation from narrow self-interest. The gist of their argument is that subjects who are initially
allocated a certain amount of money (dictators) give some money away to their counterparts (recipients),
who play no proper role in the division but to accept any share.
We design a laboratory experiment with three di⁄erent treatments in which dictators are paid less than,
more than, or equal to the recipient for each correct answer so that the agent￿ s e⁄ort is di⁄erentially rewarded
relative to the size of the pie. We provide experimental evidence to show that there is no single natural
17In total we have 72 observations (i.e., 24 observations in each treatment). We have 8 dictators choosing s = 0, one giving
s = 0:01 and another one transferring s = 0:02. In the case of the robust regression, we do not consider these observations to
isolate the in￿uence of sel￿sh dictators (outliers) who give away less than 5% of the pie and can be said to follow the theoretical
prediction s = 0. Still, we have one dictator who gives s = 0:08 in the DB treatment. We include this observation in our
analysis, but the exact same results are valid when this observation is removed. Similarly, the results are the same when we
undertake other robust procedures, such as M-estimators, which down-weight the in￿uence of outliers.
12justice principle to explain the dictator￿ s behavior but rather that justice principles are context-dependent.
Moreover, our results suggest that justice can interpreted as a constraint on otherwise self-maximizing agents.
This implies that dictators are self-interested agents who behave according to the justice principle that best
maximizes her own payo⁄.
Appendix
WELCOME TO THE EXPERIMENT! (Spanish translation)
This is an experiment to study decision making, so we are not interested in your particular choices
but rather on the individual￿ s average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated
anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.
Please do not think that we expect a particular behavior from you. However, keep in mind that your behavior
will a⁄ect the amount of money you can win.
Next, you will ￿nd instructions on the computer screen explaining how the experiment unfolds. The
instructions are the same for all subjects in the laboratory and will be read aloud by experimenters. Please
follow them carefully, as it is important that you understand the experiment before starting.
Talking is forbidden during the experiment. If you have any questions, raise your hand and remain silent.
You will be attended to by the experimenters as soon as possible.
THE EXPERIMENT
First phase
The experiment has two phases. In the ￿rst one, you are able to get money by solving a questionnaire.
The quiz that you will face is the same for all subjects in the room and contains 20 multiple-choice
questions with 5 possible answers (only one of them is correct). You have 35 minutes to solve the quiz. Each
of your correct answers will be rewarded at a reward rate that will be the same for each correct answer but
may vary across individuals. No questions will be rewarded higher than others and the reward of each correct
answer will be randomly announced once you ￿nish the questionnaire. This reward per correct answer lies
between 100 and 200 pesetas and does not depend on your performance.
You will now receive the questionnaire on a piece of paper. To answer the questions, you must use the
computer screen. Please do not write on the questionnaire, and make sure that you have selected your
answers correctly on the computer screen before continuing, as the computer will automatically check your
answers at the end of this phase. Calculators cannot be used during the experiment. You will be provided
an additional piece of paper to make computations if needed.
13Remember that during the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with each other: you can
only communicate with the experimenters.
(Subjects introduced their answers in the computer screen. See Figure 2)
Second phase
In this second phase, you will be randomly matched with a subject in this room and your total earnings
will be announced. Remember that the reward of each correct answer is randomly determined so it does not
depend on your performance in the quiz.
(Subjects were informed about their earnings. They faced a computer screen quite similar to Figure 3,
which was used for the allocation stage).
Now, you will be assigned a type, that is, you will either be player A or player B. This type is randomly
determined to choose the one subject that divides the pie. Hence, the subject selected as player A will divide
the total earnings. Remember that your choices will be treated anonymously. Neither during the experiment
nor after the experiment will you know the identity of the person you are matched with.18
18Notice that we do not constrain dictators to choose from a menu or a set of alternatives: rather, they freely decide how
to divide the earned surplus according to some internal principle. Moreover, dictators are not informed about which division
corresponds to which "justice principle". In that sense, justice principles arise naturally in our experimental design. It is also
worth noting that prices are said to be randomly determined. In each session, we have 24 subjects, who are randomly paid as
follows: 16 subjects receive a reward equal to 150 pesetas, 4 subjects are rewarded 200 pesetas, and 4 subjects are rewarded














































TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 










I. Earning Stage        
 
              :  Mean (Std. Dev.)   
 
           
                um 
           :  Mean (Std. Dev.)  -0.14 (0.17)  -0.03 (0.16)  -0.18 (0.25)  -0.11 (0.20) 









                    Minimum/ Maximum  5/16 
 
7/15 3/17  3/17 
              :  Mean (Std. Dev.)  10.17 (2.39)  10.5 (3.13)  11.96 (3.38)  10.87 (3.06)
                    Minimum/Maximum          6/16  5/19  4/18  4/19 
        
II. Allocation Stage 
 
              
      
 :    Mean (Std. Dev.)  0.44 (0.20)  0.37 (0.17)  0.36 (0.21)  0.39 (0.19) 
                    Minimum/ Maximum 









                      Share offering above 0.5    0.29  0.17  0.25  0.24 
 
:   Mean (Std. Dev.) 











     Minimum/Maximu
 
-0.60/0 -0.46/0.21  -0.69/0.10  -0.69/0.21 
Notes. There exists 24 observations in each treatment. The variables        and        are defined so as to capture the 
iple re ively.  dictator’s deviations from the accountability and the libertarian princ spect   
TABLE 2. Linear Estimates and Hypothesis Testing for the Existence of a Unique Natural Justice Principle 
  Treatment 
  DW (150:200)  DB (150:100)  Pooled Data 
I. Linear regressions     
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Bootstrapped Quantile Regression 
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II. Justice Principles 
 
      
      Accountability principle 






16.03***   
1.39                   F-test (Quantile Regression) 
                Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
25.47***  13.98*** 
0.93   3.258***  
 
4.93*** 
    
      Libertarian principle 
                F-test (Robust Regression) 
   
7.93***  
8.03***  
0.88  15.72*** 
                F-test (Quantile Regression) 
                Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
0.00  6.79*** 
4.095***  0.29  4.484*** 
      
       Egalitarian principle 






21.46***   
0.61                   F-test (Quantile Regression)  7.56***   10.70*** 








     
Notes. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The robust regression is performed using the Huber/White sandwich estimator of the variance to eroskedasticity. 
Quantile regressions are run to predict the median share of total money given to the recipient. The results are bootstrapped to correct for nonnormal and heteroskedastic errors. 
When testing the justice principles, F- tests rely on the null hypothesis Ho: α=0,β=1, for the monetary and the accountability principle. The null hypothesis Ho: α=0.5,β=0 is 
considered when the independent variable ݔ௠ to test for the egalitarian principle. The Wilcoxon signed-rank is a non-parametric procedure for testing whether the dictator’s 
deviations from the natural justice principles are zero. Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
 correct for het 
 
TABLE 3. Dictator’s behavior and Self-Serving Bias 
 
I. Linear Estimates 
 
  ߙ ො  ߚ
ݏൌߙ൅ߚ ݔ ௕ ൅ߝ
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መ 
Robust Regression (Unselfish)   




Bootstrapped Quantile Regression     





II. The bias principle 
 
  
                F-test (Robust Regression)  0.69 
                F-test (Quantile Regression)  0.35 
                Wilcoxon signed-rank test  0.10 
 
  
Notes. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The robust regression is performed using 
the Huber/White sandwich estimator of the variance to correct for heteroskedasticity. The 
regression is run over the unselfish dictators (62 observations) to decrease the influence of 
outliers. Quantile regressions are run to predict the median share of total money given to 
the recipient. The results are bootstrapped to correct for nonnormal and heteroskedastic 
errors. When testing for the bias principle, F- tests rely on the null hypothesis Ho: 
α=0,β=1. The Wilcoxon signed-rank is a non-parametric procedure for testing Ho: s = ݔ . 
Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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